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This paper examines blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions in respect of a 
multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining, when the threat of a panic 
motivates countries to take decisions quickly. The failure of the bank would cause 
unevenly distributed externalities between the countries concerned, which 
influences restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or 
one – or both of the countries – recapitalizes it. The partition of the 
recapitalisation costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from 
recapitalisation, panics and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the 
privilege of being the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational 
expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a 
blanket guarantee. 
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Monikansallisuuden ongelma pankin talletussuojan 
laajennuksessa ja pankin uudelleenjärjestelyssä 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 16/2009 
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki – Ville Mälkönen 




Keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan talletussuojan laajennuspäätöstä ja uudelleen-
järjestelyratkaisuja taloudellisiin vaikeuksiin joutuneen monikansallisen pankin 
tapauksessa. Tutkimuskehikkona on Nashin luoma neuvottelumalli sovellettuna 
niin, että talletuspaon uhka pakottaa pankin toiminta-alueen valtiot nopeisiin pää-
töksiin. Pankin uudelleenjärjestely voidaan suorittaa kahdella tavalla: joko pankki 
suljetaan (konkurssi) tai se pääomitetaan vakavaraiseksi. Koska konkurssin vaiku-
tukset jakautuisivat epätasaisesti pankin toiminta-alueella, halu estää konkurssi 
vaihtelee valtioittain. Tutkimus osoittaa, että pääomituksen kustannusten jako val-
tioiden kesken riippuu valtioiden neuvotteluvoimasta, joka puolestaan perustuu 
valtioiden hyötyihin ja haittoihin eri vaihtoehdoissa (pääomitus, konkurssi, 
talletuspako). Pankin virallisen kotimaan neuvotteluvoimaa lisää vain sillä oleva 
oikeus sulkea pankki. Tietoisuus siitä, suljetaanko konkurssitilaan ajautunut moni-
kansallinen pankki vai ei, vaikuttaa edeltävään päätökseen talletussuojan katta-
vuuden laajentamisesta. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkikriisit, talletusvakuutus, neuvottelumallit 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, G22, G28  
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The emergence of large and complex multinational banks (MNBs) has raised 
concerns that national supervision and crisis management practices – such as 
national deposit insurance schemes – should be redesigned to meet the 
requirements of the contemporary international financial markets. The concerns 
follow directly from the observation that managing for financial stability is no 
longer a national issue, as most policies targeted to restructure a distressed MNB 
involve cross-border externalities. Cross-border issues are especially important in 
the unified European financial system, where the number of pan-European banks 
is increasing and the largest institutions have systemic importance for the 
financial markets in multiple countries.
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  The effects of an MNB failure vary among the countries concerned, which 
complicates cooperation, as national authorities pursue the policies they consider 
most beneficial for their country and domestic financial system. The restructuring 
negotiations concerning Fortis in 2008 between the Belgian, Dutch and 
Luxembourg governments and central bankers offer a topical example. The 
unilateral closure of Lehman Brothers in the same year by the US authorities 
illustrates how the closure of a large and complex financial institution generates 
severe cross-border externalities. The restructuring decision might well have been 
different had there been cooperation between, for instance, European and US 
authorities. 
  History has demonstrated that regulators are unable to establish a credible pre-
commitment to a given policy scheme in banking crises. A similar commitment 
problem applies to any international ex-ante agreement on crisis management of 
an MNB, as the regulators cannot feasibly control for all states of the world in the 
contract. The most plausible prediction is that a crisis in an MNB will lead to ex-
post negotiations between the affected countries on appropriate restructuring 
policy and burden sharing. 
  Most banking crises have demonstrated that once the first signs of distress in a 
bank emerge the regulators have limited time to reach an agreement, because 
while the regulators are negotiating on appropriate intervention, uninsured 
depositors are likely to panic. The threat of panic motivates regulators to 
restructure problem banks quickly. Again, the negotiations over Fortis provide a 
convincing example: 
                                                 
1 Schoenmaker (2009, p. 2) documents: ‘Average cross-border penetration in the EU has gradually 
increased from 11% in 1995 to 21% in 2007. Turning to individual banks, the European Central 
Bank has conducted a mapping exercise of EU banking groups with significant cross-border 
activity. While the number of banks included in the analysis increased only slightly – from 41 to 
46 between years 2001 and 2005 – the consolidated assets of the sample as a whole increased from 
around 54% to 68% of overall consolidated EU banking assets.’  
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  ‘Belgium was desperate to prevent panic, because Fortis is the country’s biggest 
private sector employer and handles the bank accounts and insurance policies of 1.5 
million Belgian households, or almost half the population.’ Financial Times 29 
October 2008. 
 
In this paper we explore the equilibriums of the bargaining game that is likely to 
emerge between the home and host countries of an insolvent MNB. The 
headquarters of the bank are in the home country in which it has received its 
operating licence. The home country regulators supervise the MNB and organize 
the deposit insurance scheme for its deposits in the host country as well as in the 
home country.
2 The regulators have two policy options available: liquidate the 
MNB or recapitalize it. While any country can recapitalize the bank, the option to 
liquidate it is obviously available only to the home country regulators who granted 
its operating licence. 
  The information and cost structure of our bargaining model captures the 
issues likely to emerge in the policy negotiations. As for the cross-border 
externalities, we assume that all costs related to the restructuring policies and 
bank panics are common knowledge, but their magnitude differs between the 
countries. The bargaining power of the regulators thus depends on the magnitude 
externalities associated with the policy options and on the expected costs of a 
bank panic. 
  The main contributions of the paper are as follows. Firstly, we show that 
when a unilaterally optimal policy for the home country calls for liquidation, the 
bargaining equilibrium exhibits recapitalization, which is socially optimal. This 
result supports the argument that MNBs are more likely to become subjects of 
bail-out policies when the regulators have the option to split the fiscal burden of 
costly recapitalization. Secondly, the equilibrium of the bargaining game entails a 
joint welfare-maximizing restructuring policy, but the costs for the tax-payers are 
unevenly allocated between the countries. The cost allocation is sensitive to 
country-specific bargaining power based on the expected costs and benefits from 
recapitalization as well as the costs from bank liquidation and bank panics. The 
home regulator benefits from the privilege that it is the only entity that can legally 
liquidate the MNB. In equilibrium, one of the countries may recapitalize the MNB 
alone, or the countries may recapitalize it together. Sometimes the socially 
optimal solution is achieved when the countries decide to liquidate the MNB. 
  In many financial crises, regulators attempt to mitigate panic by extending 
deposit insurance coverage and declaring a blanket guarantee on the deposits of an 
MNB in difficulties. Usually, a blanket guarantee is put in place when the first 
signs of distress emerge, but before the bank becomes legally insolvent. 
  We analyse how a blanket guarantee affects bargaining outcomes and the 
welfare implications of blanket guarantee policies. Firstly, we show that if the 
                                                 
2 This is in line with current legislation in the EU.  
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home country takes the decision on the blanket guarantee alone, it will be too 
reluctant to declare a blanket guarantee, due to the cross-border externalities. 
Thus, the blanket guarantee decision should be negotiated between the countries. 
Secondly, when a blanket guarantee is declared, the countries will always 
recapitalize the MNB, if it turns out to be insolvent, because recapitalization is 
less expensive than liquidation of a bank with fully insured deposits. This 
indicates that the countries should bargain over partition of the recapitalization 
costs simultaneously with the declaration of the blanket guarantee, even though 
the MNB is still solvent and may yet avoid failure. Thirdly, when it is socially 
optimal to recapitalize an MNB should it become insolvent, for example owing to 
the too-big-to-fail problem, it is always socially optimal to declare a blanket 
guarantee. Fourthly, it is socially optimal to reject a blanket guarantee only if a 
bank is such that the regulators are going to close down it later if it becomes 
insolvent. 
  The paper is related to two strands in the literature. One strand is Nash’s 
(1950) classic bargaining theory. In this context, we utilize Muthoo’s (2002) 
extensive survey. The second strand of the literature consists of analysis on bank 
regulation and bank restructuring: eg Merton (1977), Mailath and Mester (1994), 
Repullo (2001, 2004, 2005), Holthausen and Ronde (2002, 2005), Calzolari and 
Loranth (2005) and Niinimäki (2009). With the exception of Repullo (2001), 
Calzolari and Loranth (2005) and Holthausen and Ronde (2005), the papers do not 
explore multinational banks.
3 
  The paper extends the existing literature on the regulation of multinational 
banks in the following directions. Holthausen and Ronde (2005) examine closure 
regulation, when it is possible to close a bank or leave it open. Regulators in both 
countries have access to private information that is relevant to the closure 
decision. Our approach differs from that in Holthausen and Ronde (2005) in 
several aspects. In their analysis, regulators are asymmetrically informed and 
exchange information, whereas in our model regulators have perfect information 
about the financial status of the MNB, which is in line with the consolidated 
supervision principle within the EU. Asymmetric information in our model is 
between the regulators and the market and revealed to the market through 
exogenous technology. This emphasizes the feature that a rapid decision is 
required when solving banking crises, because market reactions exacerbate the 
problem. 
  Holthausen and Ronde find that the equilibrium closure policies of a cheap-
talk game between the regulators are less efficient the less aligned the regulators’ 
incentives are. The bargaining results of this paper contradict this finding. We 
                                                 
3 Although theoretical and empirical research is scarce, the regulation of multinational banks has 
generated active debate: eg Mayes and Vesala (1998), Calzolari and Loranth (2001), Eisenbeis and 
Kaufman (2008) , and Schoenmaker (2008). As far as we know, this paper is the first study on 
blanket guarantee.  
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show that the outcome is a joint maximizing policy, regardless of the distribution 
of the externalities. Finally, Holthausen and Ronde focus on the problem of 
asymmetric information between the regulators. We believe that, in the case of 
multinational banking crises, where the regulators must reach agreement rapidly, 
the results of the negotiations will be mainly driven by risk of bank panics, 
deposit insurance and blanket guarantees. 
  Repullo (2001) investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank 
by a domestic bank. The takeover is more likely to be realised if the foreign bank 
is relatively small, if it is relatively risky and if the deposit insurance premium is 
lower in the domestic bank’s home country. Since Repullo concentrates on the 
determinants of international takeovers based on the risk diversification motive, 
his study differs from our paper. Calzolari and Loranth (2005) compare 
regulators’ incentives to take disciplining regulatory actions in respect of two 
types of multinational bank: branches and subsidiaries. We explore only branch 
structure in a very different model setting. 
  The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy 
and the policies of bank restructuring. Section 3 examines the Nash bargaining 
process in period 1. Section 4 gives a numeric example on the effect of deposit 




2  Restructuring policies in period 1 
We consider two countries, country A and country B. The banking sectors of the 
countries involve national banks and a multinational bank (MNB). The operations 
of the national banks are limited to the country in question. The MNB is 
organized under a branch structure so that it has headquarters in country A and a 
branch in country B. The branch structure means that the MNB is treated as a 
single legal entity that has received its operating licence from the regulators of 
country A. In line with current EU legislation, we assume that the regulator of 
country A supervises the MNB and insures its deposits.
4 It can also declare a 
blanket guarantee on deposits. The regulators share information regarding the 
MNB, but the regulator of country B cannot liquidate it. Liquidation is possible 
only by the regulator of country A (regulator A). Both regulators can, however, 
inject more equity capital into the MNB and in this way recapitalize it. 
  We explore a multinational bank in a financial downturn, which is assumed to 
extend over countries A and B. Negative news generates concerns about the 
financial condition of the MNB, which has a risk of becoming insolvent. 
                                                 
4 For current EU legislation, see Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008).  
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Furthermore, anxious depositors may panic and rush to the MNB to withdraw 
their uninsured deposits. Given the illiquidity of bank assets, a panic can drive 
even a solvent bank to failure. We investigate the optimal policies of bank 
regulators in this environment. Will the regulators extend deposit insurance 
coverage by declaring a blanket guarantee for the MNB so that its deposits 
become completely secure? If the MNB later becomes insolvent, is it liquidated or 
recapitalized? If it is recapitalized, how are the costs of recapitalization split 
between the countries? To keep the analysis simple, we investigate a 
representative MNB in a model of two periods. In period 0, the MNB is assumed 
to be solvent but a financial downturn may trigger a panic that drives it to 
bankruptcy. To eliminate panics, the regulators may decide to declare a blanket 
guarantee. In period 1, if the MNB becomes insolvent, the regulators negotiate on 
the optimal rescheduling policy and the partition of the recapitalization costs 
employing Nash bargaining. Since the optimal rescheduling policy affects the 
declaration of a blanket guarantee, the analysis is dynamic. Firstly, we focus on 
period 1 and find the optimal rescheduling policy for the insolvent MNB (Sections 
2–4). Thereafter, we turn to period 0 and investigate negotiations on the blanket 
guarantee (Section 5). 
  The MNB has no equity capital and uses deposits to fund its operations. The 
deposit insurance scheme covers a share α of deposits. The bank must therefore 
pay positive interest rud only on uninsured deposits.
5 The initial bank size is 
Dini = D(α + (1 – α)/(1 + rud)) at the start of each period as long as the bank is 
successful. At the end of a period, the volume of deposits, principal and interest, 
amounts to D  =  DA + DB where subscript A (B) is used to denote deposits 
collected from country A (B). If bank lending is successful, the value of bank 
assets is Dini + Rsuc at the end of a period, where Rsuc denotes liquid loan income 
that is spent to pay interest on uninsured deposits and dividends. In the case of 
bank failure, the value of bank assets is R < D. 
  Liquidation of bank assets entails costs and the liquidation value of the assets 
satisfies L < R. To simplify analysis, we assume the ratios of uninsured deposits 
and bank assets in countries A and B are equal to the ratio of bank deposits, 
DA/DB. 
  A net value of an insolvent MNB at the start of period 1 is V = R – D < 0. The 
regulators choose a costs-minimizing restructuring policy, σp. Subscript p denotes 
the restructuring policies available to regulators: recapitalization (σr) and 
liquidation (σl). The regulators may also be unable to reach agreement (σ0). 
 
 
                                                 
5 We do not model how the deposit interest rate of uninsured deposits is calculated, because the 
exact level of the interest rate is irrelevant for our analysis. We simply assume that uninsured 
deposits are priced correctly. If the MNB is too big to fail, the deposit interest rate of uninsured 
deposits is zero.  
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2.1 Liquidation 
If regulator A chooses liquidation, σl, it closes the MNB. The combined costs the 
countries incur for the liquidation policy are given by 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( l B l A l σ π + σ π = σ Π  (2.1) 
 
where πi(αl) < 0 is the cost of liquidation for country i. The cost is composed of 
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The functions  ) ( C i
n
i β  and  ) D ( C i
e
i  denote the costs the countries bear for 
restructuring the national banks in country i due to the liquidation of the MNB and 
the externality costs to the other sectors of the economy, respectively. Since the 
deposits of the MNB are insured by the home country, regulator A pays the 
difference,  α(D  –  L)  <  0. The rest of the liquidation proceeds, (1  –  α)L, are 
channelled to uninsured depositors. The parameter  D / D ) 1 )( L D ( i i α − − = β  
denotes country i’s uninsured depositors’ losses due to liquidation of the MNB. 
Here, D – L is the volume of the lost deposits resulting from liquidation of the 
MNB and (1 – α)Di/D is country i’s share of the uninsured deposits. 
  The restructuring costs of the national banks,  ) ( C i
n
i β , can be interpreted in the 
following manner. Since the proceeds from the MNB liquidation do not cover the 
total uninsured deposits of the MNB, these depositors bear losses.
6 In practice, 
interbank loans constitute a substantial share of the uninsured deposits. The 
MNB’s failure to repay domestic banks may have a contagious effect on other 
domestic banks, which may fail due to the lost interbank deposits. In this case, 
regulators must extend the restructuring policies to national banks.
7 The 
magnitude of the losses thus depends on the MNB’s position in the interbank 
                                                 
6 In the European Union, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive specifies the features that an 
acceptable deposit insurance scheme must have. ‘Most specifically, the system must provide 
deposit insurance coverage of 20 thousand euros, must exclude coverage of interbank deposits, ..,’ 
Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008, p. 177). 
7 The insolvency of Continental Illinois in 1984 provides an interesting example. Davison (1998, 
p. 250) reports: ‘With regard to the Continental Illinois, the regulator’s greatest concern was 
systemic risk, and therefore handing Continental through a payoff and liquidation was simply not 
considered a viable option. Continental had an extensive network of correspondent banks, almost 
2,300 of which had funds invested in Continental; more than 42 per cent of those had invested 
funds in excess of $100,000, with a total investment of almost $6 billion. The FDIC determined 
that 66 of these banks, with total assets of almost $5 billion, had more than 100 per cent of their 
equity capital invested in Continental and that an additional 113 banks with total assets of more 
than $12 billion had between 50 and 100 per cent of their equity capital invested.’ Therefore, the 
liquidation of Continental Illinois would have triggered a surge of bank failures.  
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market. To illustrate this effect we assume that an increase in uninsured deposits 
with the MNB increases the cost country i incurs for the MNB’s inability to meet 
its obligations 
 
1 / ) ( C 0 i i
n
i < β ∂ β ∂ ≤  (2.3) 
 
This expression implies that the total restructuring costs of national banks in 
country i due to the failure of the MNB are less than the amount of country i’s 
depositors’ uninsured deposits with the MNB,  i i
n
i D ) 1 ( ) ( C α − < β  for all  i β .
8 
Intuitively, the losses of the national bank consist entirely of their uninsured 
deposits with the MNB. The MNB obviously has uninsured deposits from 
multiple investors. Therefore, the deposits of national banks are only a fraction of 
the total uninsured deposits on the books of the MNB. In addition, the initial 
wealth of the national banking sector is positive. Thus, the restructuring costs of 
the national banks are lower than the volume of the uninsured deposits with the 
MNB. 
  The negative externalities to the other sectors of the economy resulting from 
the closure of the MNB,  ) D ( C i
e
i , involve, for example, the costs related to 
disturbances to the payment system and lending relationships in country i. We 
assume the function satisfies 
 
0 D / ) D ( C i i
e
i > ∂ ∂  (2.4) 
 
as it is plausible to think that this effect is increasing in the volume of the MNB’s 




The second policy option for the regulator is recapitalization of the insolvent 
multinational bank, where regulators inject fresh equity capital into the MNB so 
as to boost its value from negative to zero. The MNB can then be resold to private 
investors. Essentially, recapitalization is a bail-out policy that insulates all 
depositors – whether or not their deposits are insured – from losses they would 
incur if the regulators closed the bank. The policy therefore eliminates the damage 
to other banks,  ) ( C i
n
i β . The negative externalities to the payment system and 
long-term lending relationships,  ) D ( C i
e
i , are also avoided, because no banks are 
                                                 
8 We do not study how the national banks are restructured. We simply assume that the 
restructuring process is optimal.  
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closed down. The financial costs of the recapitalization may, however, turn out to 
be high relative to liquidation. Formally, the costs of recapitalization are
9 
 




If the countries fail to reach agreement, this is termed the disagreement point and 
leads to two types of costs arising in the bargaining model, and in practice: the 
risk of a panic and the costs of maintaining the operations of the insolvent MNB. 
  Let us first consider a panic during period 1 when the MNB is insolvent. The 
risk of the panic is defined in a standard way. Let γ1Δ denote the risk of a panic 
during an extremely short time period, that is, Δ approaches zero. Since the bank 
is now insolvent it can be hit both by information-based panics and by pure 
panics.
10 Even if a negotiated solution is achieved in the Nash bargaining process 
at the start of period 0, the risk of a panic influences the bargaining equilibrium 
via the disagreement point (see Muthoo, 2002). 
  When a panic occurs, the MNB must liquidate its illiquid assets to meet the 
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The constraint (2.3) is also satisfied for 
i β . The losses of uninsured depositors are 
smaller under a panic than under liquidation:  i i β < β . This follows from the fact 
that under liquidation uninsured depositors’ share of the bank’s liquidation 
proceeds is  α − 1 , whereas under a panic they have access to the full amount of 




i β ≤ β . 
  The restructuring costs of national banks due to the failure of the MNB are 
likely to be lower under a panic than under liquidation, because panic implies a 
smaller volume of lost interbank deposits. The total costs of a panic add up to 
                                                 
9 We explore only two alternatives, liquidation and recapitalization, because the costs from 
recapitalization are almost the same as the costs from several other methods: nationalization, the 
purchase and assumption method and a merger with a large solvent bank. In each alternative, 
uninsured depositors do not (usually) lose their deposits and the regulators need to use sufficient 
fresh funds that the value of the insolvent bank’s assets equals the value of its deposits. 
10 Two main views on bank panics exist. According to the first view, panics are pure panics but the 
second view rests on the idea of information based bank runs. In his extensive empirical analysis 
on the Great Depression, Wicker (2000) finds supporting evidence for both views. For theoretical 
analysis on pure panics see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Niinimäki (2003) whereas Jacklin 
and Bhattacharya (1988) model information based runs. Chen and Hasan (2008) construct a model 
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Lemma 1 compares the costs of panic to those the regulators incur for liquidation. 
The proof is in Appendix A.
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Lemma 1. The cost of a bank panic is globally (and for country A) higher than 
the cost of liquidation. The cost of a panic is, however, lower than the cost of 
liquidation for country B.
12 
 
In addition to the risk of a panic, the disagreement point includes the costs from 
maintaining the operations of the insolvent MNB. Recall that the MNB must pay 
positive interest rud on risky uninsured deposits in each period. If no agreement is 
reached, regulator A needs to inject fresh funds into the MNB so that it can pay 
interest on uninsured deposits. Compounding the interest continuously gives 
r = ln(l + rud). The contribution of higher interest payments to the cost of delaying 
the decision for regulator A is therefore given by 
 
[ ] D ) 1 ( 1 ) r 1 ( ) ( ud α − − + = Δ ρ
Δ  (2.8) 
 
We have now found out two costs from disagreement and next we will unify the 
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We have now detailed the costs and benefits from three policies of bank 
restructuring: liquidation, recapitalization and disagreement. We are thus in a 
                                                 
11 Continental Illinois gives a good example regarding the speed and scale of a panic. Billions of 
dollars were withdrawn from the bank very quickly. The panic started on May 9 1984, and by May 
11 Continental had to borrow $3.6 billion at the Federal Reserve’s discount window to make up 
for its lost deposits. During the following weekend, Continental aimed to solve its problems by 
creating a $4.5 billion loan package provided by 16 banks, but this was insufficient to stop the 
panic. The volume of withdrawn deposits during the panic exceeded $10 billion (Davison, 1998). 
12 The result: ‘The cost of a panic is … lower than the cost of liquidation for country B’ may be 
surprising. It is based on the uninsured depositors’ ability to withdraw a lot of funds from the 
MNB during a panic. Thus, regulator B favours a panic to liquidation. This type of effect could be 
avoided if the liquidation value of assets was sufficiently lower under a panic than under standard 
liquidation. For simplification, we have not made this kind of assumption. We also simplify the 
study by assuming that the MNB’s assets are exhausted in a panic. In reality, regulator A might 
close the doors of the bank when the panic has continued for a while. The simplification does not 
affect the key ideas of this paper.  
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position to examine which policies will be chosen in the bargaining process and 
determine how the countries share the fiscal burden of restructuring an MNB. 
 
 
3  Nash bargaining in period 1 
3.1 Equilibrium 
At the start of period 1, the MNB is insolvent and the regulators begin 
negotiations on a restructuring policy. Since the regulators’ incentives are not 
perfectly aligned, both countries have an incentive to negotiate. We begin with the 
following observation. 
 
Lemma 2. Recapitalization is a joint welfare-maximizing policy, 
) ( ) ( ) ( l B l A r σ π + σ π > σ Π , when the value of bank assets is high, the liquidation 
value of the assets is low and the share of insured deposits is high. When the size 
of the MNB (DA or DB) increases under the fixed value of bank assets, the cost of 
liquidation drops relative to the costs from recapitalization, if the negative 
externalities to the payment system and lending relationships,  ) D ( C i
e
i  are small. 
 
Proof: This is easy to see from  ) ( ) ( ) ( l B l A r σ π − σ π − σ Π . QED 
 
The results just derived indicate that a bargaining situation emerges only when 
recapitalization is a joint welfare-dominating policy. We model the policy 
negotiations as Nash bargaining. The assumption is plausible, because the 
bargaining outcome is identical to that of Rubinstein’s (1982) model, when the 
time period between the bargaining rounds, Δ, approaches zero. This feature is 
quite realistic in the restructuring negotiations where the time the regulators use to 
decide on policies regarding restructuring a large bank is counted in hours rather 
than in days. Furthermore, the timing of negotiations is usually allocated to 
weekends and holidays, when the financial markets and banks are closed. 
  The solution of the bargaining game is driven by outside options. Since 
country A is the regulator of the MNB, it has more outside options than country 
B. Country A can liquidate the bank without the permission of country B or 
recapitalize it, whereas Country B can only decide to unilaterally recapitalize it. 
The bargaining equilibrium,  A r B A x ) ( x , x − σ Π = , is a solution to the problem 
 
) d x )( d x ( max B B A A
x , x b a
− −  (3.1) 
 
where ). ( C d , / D ) 1 )( r 1 ln( ) ( C d 0 B B l ud 0 A A σ = γ α − + − σ =   
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Here dA and dB denote the utilities from the disagreement point to country A and 
country B. The equilibrium satisfies Π(σr) = xA + xB, because the recapitalization 
payments of the countries must add up to the costs of recapitalization. 
  Proposition 1, below, illustrates the equilibrium of the bargaining process. 
The first part illustrates the outcome under the assumption that the regulators do 
not have outside options to unilaterally restructure the MNB. The second part 
derives an equilibrium when the option to recapitalize the MNB alone (weakly) 
welfare-dominates the equilibrium without outside options. This occurs when 
[] 0 ), ( x , x r B A σ Π ∉ . The last part of the result illustrates the outcome when country 
A’s outside option to liquidate the MNB is binding. This means that the option to 
liquidate is a welfare-dominating option for regulator A compared with the 
outcome of a bargaining process with recapitalization as the only outside option. 
 
Proposition 1. 
i) The equilibrium of the Nash bargaining process without outside options is 
 
2
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iii) Two cases appear, depending on whether regulator A’s option to liquidate the 
MNB is binding 
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A x , x  denote the true partition of the recapitalization costs. 
 
In an equilibrium where the regulators cannot unilaterally recapitalize or liquidate 
the MNB, a regulator may end up with a payment that is positive in equilibrium. 
That is, he earns profits from bank recapitalization. This result is implausible in 
theory and in practice, because the regulator would have an incentive to maximize 
the number of insolvent banks to collect payments from the foreign regulators.  
18 
The payment of the foreign regulators would exceed the true costs of bank 
recapitalization. Therefore, the foreign regulators would rather recapitalize the 
MNB alone than accept the payment. 
  So far we have investigated a case in which recapitalization represents the 
socially optimal solution. Suppose now that liquidation is the optimal policy. This 
produces the following result. 
 
Lemma 3. If liquidation of the MNB is a joint welfare-maximizing policy, the 
MNB is liquidated at once. 
 
Proof: The outside option point (liquidation) affects the set of possible utility 
pairs on which the Nash solution can be defined by requiring that each partition of 
recapitalization costs be such that the payment of a country is at most as severe as 
the cost the country would bear from its outside option. Liquidation is a joint 
welfare-maximizing policy when  ) ( ) ( ) ( l B l A r σ π + σ π < σ Π . Then, it is easy to 
observe that any partition of the recapitalization costs such that xA + xB = Π(σr), 
when xA ≥ πA(σl), xB ≥ πB(σl), is impossible (since πB(σ0) > πB(σl), country B 
never pays more than πB(σl)). The Nash bargaining solution cannot be achieved. 
Country A opts out and liquidates the MNB (recall πA(σ0) < πA(σl)). For more 




3.2 Comparative  statics 
In this subsection we explore how sensitive the results are to assumptions 
regarding the restructuring costs, the relative size of the MNB and the deposit 
insurance policy applied by the home country. We focus on an equilibrium that 
involves burden sharing. Using the notation in Proposition 1, this means that 
) ( x 0 r i σ Π ≥ ≥  Focusing on interior solutions narrows the analysis to outcomes 
where changes in the parameters have an effect. 
  In a burden-sharing equilibrium the countries recapitalize the MNB. When 
regulator A’s option to liquidate the MNB is not binding, the cost allocation is 
driven by the cost of a panic and the interest payments country A bears for each 
time period the MNB is at the state of insolvency. These determinants, in turn, 
depend on the deposit insurance policy and the relative size of the MNB. 
  An increase in the size of the MNB in one of the countries affects the burden-
sharing outcome through the costs the country bears in the event of a panic or 
liquidation of the MNB. More specifically, if the relative share of the MNB’s 
deposits in country i = A, B increases, but the overall quantity of deposits with the 
MNB remains unchanged, this will obviously increase the cost of a panic, and  
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therefore weaken regulator i’s position in the negotiations. The following 
corollaries are proved in Appendix B. 
 
Corollary 1. When the size of the multinational bank remains unchanged, but a 
relatively larger share of its operations take place in Country A (Country B), its 
share of the recapitalization payment rises whether or not the liquidation option of 
Country A is binding. 
 
This result is intuitively straightforward. The outcomes of burden-sharing 
negotiations depend on the relative size of the MNB, which is a determinant of its 
importance in the financial system of the country and the economic externalities 
of a bank failure. These effects make the countries weaker in the negotiations, and 
therefore increase their share of the overall costs of recapitalization. 
  The fresh capital the regulator of country A must inject into the insolvent 
MNB so as to cover the interest the MNB must pay to uninsured depositors during 
policy negotiations affects the bargaining power of the countries differently. The 
rise in these interest payments weakens the position of country A in the 
negotiations and increases its share of the recapitalization payment in the 
equilibrium where the liquidation option is not binding.
13 If the liquidation option 
is binding, interest rates have no effect, because country A always pays just the 
amount equal to the cost of liquidation, which is independent of the interest rate. 
  The implications of the deposit insurance scheme on the bargaining 
equilibrium are as follows. 
 
Corollary 2. Suppose that the deposit insurance coverage is extended. When the 
liquidation option is binding, country A’s share of the recapitalization payments 
increases. The effect on the bargaining equilibrium is uncertain when the 
liquidation option is not binding. However, if the MNB is too big to fail and 
always recapitalized, the risk premium on uninsured deposits is zero, rud = 0. In 
this case, the payment of country A increases. 
 
Corollary 2 shows that when deposit insurance has a higher coverage, the 
reimbursements country A must pay when it liquidates the MNB increase. Higher 
coverage obviously alleviates the losses for uninsured depositors (national banks), 
thereby contributing to lower liquidation costs. Comparison of these effects shows 
that the first effect dominates. An extension of the coverage therefore increases 
the share of Country A when the liquidation constraint is binding. 
  When the option to liquidate is not binding, the outcomes are also affected by 
the implications of changes in the deposit insurance on the economy of country B 
and the interest rate payments country A must pay to the uninsured depositors. 
                                                 
13 This follows immediately from the expression  A x   
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More specifically, higher coverage mitigates the losses of uninsured depositors in 
Country B, which weakens country A’s position in the negotiations. On the other 
hand, higher coverage decreases the amount of capital regulator A must inject into 
an insolvent MNB during the bargaining process, which reduces country A’s 
share of the total burden. The overall effect is uncertain, unless we take into 
account the property that burden sharing implies recapitalization, which 
essentially makes the uninsured deposits risk free. Under rational expectations and 
perfect markets, this means that the interest rate on the uninsured deposits is zero, 
and, therefore, the impact of higher deposit insurance on the burden-sharing 
negotiations is negative from the viewpoint of country A. 
 
 
3.3  Policy negotiations under blanket guarantee or 
subordinated deposits 
The previous subsection illustrated that the deposit insurance scheme run by the 
home country determines – at least to some extent – how the countries share the 
fiscal burden when a systemically important MNB requires restructuring. There is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence on banking crises suggesting that equally important 
are the adjustments policy-makers make when they observe the potential for a 
crisis to emerge. In practice, ex-ante agreements on deposit insurance coverage 
are usually revised ex-post to mitigate panic and sustain confidence. These 
adjustments usually involve a blanket guarantee that raises deposit insurance to 
100%, thereby insulating the bank against runs. 
  In the present model we allow the regulators to declare a blanket guarantee at 
the start of period 0. Alternatively, panics can be eliminated by injecting sufficient 
subordinated deposits (capital) into the MNB. For simplification we assume that, 
if the regulators declare a blanket guarantee or inject subordinated debt into the 
MNB, the decision is definitive. A blanket guarantee or subordinated deposits 
cannot be removed at the start of period 1.
14 The effect of a blanket guarantee on 
the outcomes in the ex-post negotiations are as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. If a blanket guarantee is declared at the start of period 0 and the 
bank later becomes insolvent, it will be recapitalized with certainty. If country A 
declares a blanket guarantee alone, it must always pay the whole recapitalization 
bill alone. 
 
                                                 
14 A solution in which the regulators remove the blanket guarantee at the start of period 1 is a bit 
eccentric. The regulators learn at the start of period 1 if the MNB is insolvent. They could 
immediately first remove the blanket guarantee and then liquidate the bank. This type of solution 
might be illegal, as it would cause severe losses for uninsured depositors. Alternatively, uninsured 
depositors might panic at the end of period 0 just before the maturity of blanket guarantee.  
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Proof: Suppose a blanket guarantee is declared for the deposits of the MNB at the 
start of period 0 and the MNB later becomes insolvent. If the MNB is 
recapitalized at the start of period 1, it can keep on operating. The losses of 
interbank deposits in the national banking sector are avoided as well as negative 
externalities to the payment system and lending relationships. The costs of 
recapitalization amount to D – R. 
  Suppose now that the MNB is liquidated. Thanks to the blanket guarantee, the 
liquidation entails no losses to other banks,  0 (.) C
n
A = . Yet, since the MNB has 
been closed, the liquidation causes negative externalities in the payment system 
and lending relationships,  0 (.) C
e
A > . The payments to depositors entail costs   
D – L. Since D – L > D – R > 0, the costs are higher than under recapitalization. 
Thus, it is optimal to recapitalize the MNB if a blanket guarantee has been 
declared. 
  Suppose that country A declares a blanket guarantee alone. When regulator A 
suggests in period 1 negotiations regarding recapitalization, regulator B declines 
in the knowledge that regulator A will capitalize the MNB with certainty even 
without the participation of regulator B. QED 
 
Alternatively, the countries can inject subordinated deposits (capital) into the 
MNB at the beginning of period 0. When the amount of subordinated deposits is 
D – L, standard depositors cannot lose anything in a panic, because the liquidation 
value of bank assets, L, is equal to the value of their deposits. Consequently, the 
depositors know that their deposits are perfectly safe and thus have no reason to 
panic. Panic is therefore avoided. The result is as follows. 
 
Proposition 3. If regulators inject subordinated deposits into the MNB at the start 
of period 0 and the bank later becomes insolvent, it will be recapitalized with 
certainty. 
 
Proof: Suppose that the regulators (or one of them) inject subordinated deposits 
into the MNB at the start of period 0. The panic is avoided. If the MNB proves to 
be solvent, the regulators bear no losses, because the risk-free interest rate is zero. 
  Suppose now that the bank proves to be insolvent. The regulators have two 
options. They can either liquidate the MNB or recapitalize it. If they liquidate it, 
they lose the subordinated deposits and liquidation causes negative externalities 
for the payment system and lending relationships,  0 (.) C
e
A > . If they recapitalize 
it, this entails costs D – R, which is less than the amount of subordinated deposits. 
There are no negative externalities. Hence, the regulators optimally recapitalize 




4  Effect of deposit insurance coverage: a numeric 
example 
This section gives a numeric example which indicates that the deposit insurance 
coverage is likely to have a strong impact on the partition of the recapitalization 
costs. In the example, we consider an economy with the following parameters. 
Firstly, the parameter values are such that: DA = 10, DB = 200, L = 160, rud = 0.05, 
γl = 0.9. Secondly, we assume the costs of restructuring national banking equals 
20% of the lost uninsured deposits in the MNB failure. Finally, the value of 
negative externalities on the payment system and the long-term lending 
relationships equals 10% of the bank size (the amount of deposits). Table 4.1 
illustrates four examples with the given parameter values and different levels of 
deposit insurance coverage. 
 
Table 4.1  The effect of insurance 
 
The column on the left shows the deposit insurance coverage. The next columns indicate 
externalities on other banks and the economy in both countries, the value of the liquidation option, 
costs to countries A and B from a panic, and the need to inject fresh funds into the MNB in each 
bargaining round, F  =  ln1.05(1  –  α)D/γl. The final two columns show the result from Nash 











B C πA(σl) CA(σ0)C B(σ0) F  A x   B x  
2%  0.47 1 9.33 20 -2.47  -5.6 -28.7 11.16  0.92  -10.92
5%  0.45 1 9.05 20 -3.95 -11.9 -27.5 10.82  -2.6 -7.4 
10% 0.43 1 8.57 20 -6.43 -22.3 -25.5 10.25  -8.5 -1.5 
23% 0.37 1 7.33  20  -12.87 -49.3  -20.3 8.77  -23.9  13.9 
 
 
When the share of insured deposits is 2%, the liquidation option is not binding  
(–2.47 < 0.92), but the recapitalization option of Country B is binding, because  
–10 > –10.92. Thus, country B recapitalizes the MNB alone and pays –10. When 
the share of insured deposits is 5%, the liquidation option is not binding, because 
–2.6  >  –3.95. The recapitalization options are also not binding, because –2.6,   
–7.4 > –10. The MNB is thus recapitalized according to the standard bargaining 
equilibrium without outside options. In this case, the share of country A is –2.6 
and that of country B is –7.4. 
  When the share of insured deposits is 10%, the liquidation option of country 
A is binding: –6.43 > –8.5. Here, the share of country A is –6.43 and Country B 
pays the rest: –3.57. When the share of insured deposits is 23%, country A 
chooses the outside option to recapitalize the MNB alone.  
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  This example shows that each of the four cases derived in section 3 is 
possible, depending on the deposit insurance scheme. This emphasizes the feature 
that the regulatory framework designed before a crisis will be a factor in 
determining the negotiations when an intervention is required to solve financial 
problems during a crisis in an MNB. 
 
 
5  Blanket guarantee or subordinated deposits in 
period 0 
5.1 Background 
Recall that at the start of period 0 financial distress extends over countries A and 
B but the MNB is solvent. The financial distress together with mounting news on 
financial difficulties and bankruptcies in the economy may make uninsured 
depositors nervous so that they panic and aim to withdraw their deposits from the 
MNB. Since the MNB is solvent, a panic represents a pure panic. Given the 
illiquidity of bank assets, the panic drives even the solvent MNB to bankruptcy by 
exhausting its assets to zero. The probability of panics is γ0Δ, where Δ approaches 
zero. Here we have γ0 ≤ γl: the probability of a panic is at least as high during 
period 1 as during period 0, because the bank is already insolvent in period 1. The 
probability that a panic occurs during period 0 is 
 
0 e 1 t
γ − − =  (5.1) 
 
When the regulators at the start of period 0 observe the financial distress, they 
become aware of the threat of insolvency and panics. Since the bank is still 
solvent, the regulators have two options.
15 They can extend the deposit insurance 
coverage by declaring a blanket guarantee so that the deposits of the MNB are 
protected, which prevents panics. Alternatively, one of the countries (or both) can 
inject sufficient subordinated deposits into the MNB so that panics are avoided. 
  We have noticed above that blanket guarantee an injection of subordinated 
deposits generate the very same costs and benefits. Firstly, panics are avoided. 
Secondly, if the MNB proves to be insolvent it is optimally recapitalized. Thirdly, 
                                                 
15 Regulators must have précis hard evidence on insolvency before than they can begin the 
liquidation process. Closing a solvent bank destroys the value of bank assets due to the costs of 
liquidation. Additionally, and more importantly, regulators cannot use illegal methods. The 
following example is from Argentina (BIS, 1999, p. 62): ‘In Argentina, judges forced the central 
bank to compensate the shareholders on the grounds that a bank was solvent at the time of 
intervention, and that the insolvency actually resulted from mismanagement during the 
intervention.’  
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if the MNB proves to be solvent, neither the blanket guarantee nor subordinated 
debt entails costs. Therefore, the regulators are indifferent between these two 
methods. Since the implementation of blanket guarantee is simple (no debt 
investment into the MNB is needed), we assume the regulators will prefer this 
alternative. Consequently, in the following, only a blanket guarantee is explored. 
Although only country A can declare a blanket guarantee, the countries optimally 
negotiate the solution together (this is shown below) and decide jointly on the 
partition of costs, and country A finally declares the blanket guarantee. 
  The probability that the MNB turns out to be solvent at the end of period 0 is 
s. It is insolvent with probability 1 – s. Recall from above that without a blanket 





5.2  When does a blanket guarantee represent the socially 
optimal policy? 
It is socially optimal to declare a blanket guarantee if 
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The right-hand side (RHS) expresses the expected costs from a blanket guarantee. 
With probability 1 – s the MNB turns out to be insolvent and is recapitalized 
(Propositions 2 and 3). The second term on the RHS is positive, because a blanket 
guarantee allows the MNB can attract uninsured deposits without a risk premium. 
This cuts the interest payments of the MNB by (1 – α)Drud and thus reduces the 
expected costs of recapitalization. 
  The left-hand side (LHS) reveals the expected costs without a blanket 
guarantee. The second term represents a case in which the MNB avoids a panic 
during period 0 but becomes insolvent in period 1. Negotiations regarding the 
optimal restructuring policy then begin. The negotiations are illustrated in 
Sections 2–4. The results from the negotiations (the expected costs to country A 
from the optimal restructuring policy) are denoted by πA(σ*). If country A, for 
example, recapitalizes the MNB alone, then πA(σ*) = Π(σr), but if country B pays 
the recapitalization bill alone, then πA(σ*) = 0. The first term on the LHS shows a 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, it is possible to drop the assumption on financial distress and assume that the 
regulators receive at the start of period 0 a signal that MNB is insolvent. The signal is true with 
probability s. The depositors learn the signal with probability t and panic. The regulators cannot 
close the bank, because the bank is not insolvent with certainty. The closure decision needs to be 
based on hard, verifiable information.  
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new term, πi(σ0S), i ∈ {A,B}, which denotes the costs when a solvent MNB fails 
due to a panic. It is equal to the costs when an insolvent bank fails due to a panic, 
πi(σ0), i ∈ {A,B}. Thus, we use symbol πi(σ0). 
  It is easy to see from the LHS that the solution in which only one country 
takes the decision on a blanket guarantee (or subordinated debt) alone cannot be 
optimal because said country pays attention only to its own costs and benefits. 
Thus, the countries need to take the decision together. 
  If the optimal restructuring policy in (5.2) is recapitalization, we have 
πA(σ*) + πB(σ*) = Π(σr), but if it is liquidation, the costs are πA(σ*) = πA(σl) and 
πB(σ*) = πB(σl). When the socially optimal restructuring policy is recapitalization, 
the result is as follows. 
 
Proposition 4. When the MNB is such that the socially optimal restructuring 
policy is to recapitalize it, it is socially optimal to declare a blanket guarantee 
when financial distress is observed. 
 
Proof: Inserting πA(σ*) + πB(σ*) = Π(σr) into (5.2) provides 
 
ud r 0 B 0 A Dr ) 1 )( s 1 ( )) ( ) s 1 ( ) ( ) ( ( t α − − ≤ σ Π − − σ π + σ π  (5.3) 
 
The RHS is positive, but the LHS is negative because πA(σ0) + πB(σ0) < 
πA(σl) + πB(σl) < Π(σr). QED 
 
Intuitively, if the MNB later proves to be insolvent, a blanket guarantee entails no 
extra costs, because the MNB will be recapitalized even without it. If the MNB 
proves to be solvent, the guarantee also entails no cost, because no recapitalization 
is needed. Yet, since it can eliminate the threat of a panic, it is optimal to declare a 
blanket guarantee. 
  Suppose now that the socially optimal restructuring policy is liquidation. 
Restating (5.2), we observe that blanket guarantee is socially optimal if 
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The term on the LHS is negative. On the RHS the first term is negative, because 
liquidation is now preferred to recapitalization, and the second term is positive. If 
the RHS is positive (this is possible only if rud is high), the inequality is always 
true and a blanket guarantee is optimal. If the RHS is negative, the inequality is 
satisfied if the probability of a panic is sufficiently high and the probability of 
bank insolvency, 1 – s, is sufficiently low. On the contrary, if 1 – s is large in  
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comparison with t, the inequality is not satisfied and no blanket guarantee is 
declared. A conclusion follows. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that the socially optimal restructuring policy is 
liquidation. The parameter values will then determine whether it is optimal to 
declare a blanket guarantee. The probability that a blanket guarantee is declared 
increases with the probability of a panic, but decreases with the probability of 
bank insolvency. 
 
We analyse in more detail a case in which the RHS of (5.4) is negative and the 
parameter values influence the optimal decision. 
  If the probability of a panic is high and the probability of insolvency is 
sufficiently low, it is optimal to declare a blanket guarantee. Now the risk that a 
panic will destroy a solvent MNB is severe. To prevent this, a blanket guarantee is 
needed. In addition, since the probability of bank insolvency is low, the 
probability that the regulators will need to recapitalize an insolvent bank is also 
low. Hence, the expected recapitalization costs owing to a blanket guarantee are 
small. Suppose that a blanket guarantee is declared. If the MNB proves to be 
solvent at the start of period 1, it can keep on operating. If insolvent, it is 
recapitalized, because it is always optimal to recapitalize the MNB under a 
blanket guarantee (Proposition 2). Note that the blanket guarantee changes the 
restructuring policy. If the restructuring process began at the start of period 1, it 
would be optimal to liquidate the MNB. Yet, when the threat of a panic during 
period 0 is recognized, it is optimal to declare a blanket guarantee at the start of 
period 0 and in this way make recapitalization the optimal restructuring policy. 
  When the risk of a panic is small and the probability of insolvency is high, it 
is not optimal to declare a blanket guarantee, as this would raise the costs of bank 
restructuring, because the insolvent MNB would then be recapitalized instead of 
the socially optimal liquidation. This ‘mistake’ is likely, because 1 – s is high. On 
the other hand, the risk that a panic will destroy a solvent MNB is small. Under 
the policy choice of no blanket guarantee, a panic may drive the MNB to failure. 
If a panic is avoided, the financial condition of the MNB becomes apparent at the 
start of period 1. If the MNB is solvent, it can keep on operating. If it proves to be 
insolvent, it is liquidated. 
  Given propositions 4 and 5, if the regulators do not declare a blanket 





5.3 Nash  bargaining in period 0 
When the regulators at the start of period 0 observe financial distress they analyse 
whether it is optimal to declare a blanket guarantee.
17 Since declaration of a 
blanket guarantee will make recapitalization the optimal policy at a later stage, the 
countries need to bargain over the costs of recapitalization at the same time. 
  Consider the disagreement point of country A in Nash bargaining. If the 
countries are unable to reach agreement, the bargaining process stops at the start 
of period 0. If the MNB later proves to be insolvent, a new bargaining process 
begins in period 1 (sections 2–4). The disagreement point of country A is 
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The first term on the RHS expresses the expected costs from a panic during period 
0. The risk of a panic is present because no blanket guarantee is declared. The 
second term reveals the expected costs to country A from the optimal 
restructuring policy in period 1. These costs are realized only if the bank does not 
fail in a panic and if it proves to be insolvent. Note that (5.5) also represents the 
outside option of country A. It can opt out from the negotiations in period 0 , wait 
for a period and then restart the negotiations in period 1 if the MNB then proves to 
be insolvent. 
  In the same way, the disagreement point and outside option of country B is 
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The outside options to opt out from the negotiations and to enter them in period 1 
are not binding because these effects are already taken into account in the 
disagreement points. On the contrary, the outside options to recapitalize the MNB 
alone may be binding. In addition, the recapitalization payments of countries A 
and B, XA, XB, must cover the recapitalization costs 
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The equilibrium partition of the recapitalization costs is found using two steps. 
First, we calculate the Nash bargaining solution without outside options. Then, we 
add the outside options to recapitalize the MNB alone (see Muthoo, p. 149–152). 
The solution to the bargaining problem maximizes 
 
                                                 
17 The fact that only country A can declare a blanket guarantee has no effect on the bargaining 
process, because the very same allocation can be achieved by employing subordinated debt and 
both regulators have the same opportunities to invest subordinated debt in the MNB.  
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subject to constraints (5.5)–(5.7). The Nash bargaining process provides 
 
Proposition 6. In period 0 the Nash bargaining process gives partition 
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When the outside options to recapitalize the MNB alone are recognized, we 
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Obviously, the Nash bargaining solution is not feasible if the utility in the 
breakdown point exceeds the bargaining payoff. Hence, the bargaining solution is 
obtained only if 
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This is the same constraint as in (5.2). Hence, the Nash bargaining solution is an 
equilibrium when it is socially optimal to recapitalize the MNB. If (5.9) is not 
satisfied, the breakdown point comes true. No blanket guarantee is declared and 
the restructuring decision is postponed to period 1. The MNB is liquidated in 
period 1 if it then proves to be insolvent. However, this is again the socially 
optimal solution because (5.2) is not satisfied. Consequently, the Nash bargaining 
process provides the socially optimal decision. 
 
Proposition 7. Suppose that uninsured depositors panic with certainty under the 
financial distress. If the amount of uninsured deposits does not exceed the value of 
the insolvent bank’s assets, (1  –  α)D ≤  R, the regulators declare a blanket 
guarantee. 
 
Proof: Now (5.2) simplifies to 
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29 
 
The LHS is at most –αD (the payments on insured deposits) and the RHS is larger 
than R – D. Hence, (5.10) is satisfied at least when –αD ≤ R – D. This implies that 
if (1 – α)D ≤ R, it is always optimal to declare a blanket guarantee. QED 
 
Recall that it is implicitly assumed L < (1 – α)D; uninsured depositors bear losses 
in a panic. Therefore, we have L < (1 – α)D < R. Since (1 – α)D < R, the volume 
of uninsured deposits is sufficiently low in comparison with the value of the 
insolvent bank’s assets, R, and the regulators optimally declare blanket guarantee. 
This is anticipated correctly by rational depositors. They know that even if their 
deposits are officially uninsured, the regulators will declare blanket guarantee 
when the financial crisis appears. Consequently, the uninsured deposits will also 
be secured and rational depositors are ready to save in them without a risk 
premium. 
 When  (1  –  α)D < L, the volume of uninsured deposits is so small that they 
can be withdrawn from the bank as a whole in a panic of period 0. This makes 
uninsured depositors de facto risk free. Yet, since the flight of uninsured deposits 
would cause liquidation costs and thereby erode the value of the MNB’s assets, 
the regulators optimally declare blanket guarantee. Consequently, when the MNB 
attracts uninsured deposits it optimally attracts short-term deposits. The liquidity 
of uninsured deposits makes them de facto risk free, because depositors can 
withdraw them immediately when the financial distress appears. The bank 
regulators, who must base bank closure decisions on hard verifiable information, 
cannot close down the MNB in period 0 even if they observe the flight of 
uninsured deposits and the erosion in the value of bank assets. To avoid the flight 




This paper studies equilibrium restructuring policies when regulators observe that 
a multinational bank (MNB) is in financial distress and how countries affected by 
the crisis share the financial burden. To this end, we develop a bargaining model 
that describes the key elements of policy negotiations likely to emerge and cross-
border externalities that shape the regulators’ decision whether to liquidate or 
recapitalize the MNB. The model illustrates that ex-post burden-sharing, which is 
an outcome of a policy bargaining after the MNB is found to be insolvent, 
(weakly) welfare-dominates unilaterally designed restructuring policies. 
  The equilibria of the model exhibit the usual properties in bargaining models, 
because the outside options available for the regulators determine the burden-
sharing outcomes. Since the home country regulator has the legal right to liquidate  
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and close the MNB, it has stronger bargaining power when the cost of the option 
to liquidate is low relative to the cost the country incurs when it recapitalizes the 
MNB jointly with the foreign regulator. However, the feature, which is line with 
the current European legislation, that the home country is running the deposit 
insurance scheme of the MNB increases its share of the costs when the share of 
insured deposits in the MNB is larger. The home country also has the 
responsibility to maintain the operations of an insolvent MNB during the 
bargaining process, and therefore, it has an incentive accept less generous burden 
sharing offers to prevent delays in policy implementation. 
  Financial distress in the MNB may trigger a panic among depositors. The risk 
of a panic and the resulting breakdown of negotiations affect both countries, and 
therefore, the country with a high expected cost of a panic is more likely to end up 
with a higher share of the total costs. In the model a panic induces negative 
externalities for the payment systems in the countries, lending relationships and 
uninsured depositors. Thus, the expected costs from a breakdown point are high in 
a country where a relatively large proportion of the MNB’s operations take place. 
The costs resulting from a panic are, however, relatively higher for the home 
country, because a panic among uninsured depositors destroys the value of the 
MNB the regulator can channel for insured depositors. 
  To prevent panics, regulators often declare a blanket guarantee on the deposits 
of the MNB or inject subordinated deposits into it. We illustrate that a blanket 
guarantee, which is declared before the regulators learn the financial status of the 
MNB, always induces recapitalization should the MNB become insolvent. The 
decision of a blanket guarantee can be made by the home country and the decision 
affects the ex-post policy bargaining. The countries may therefore have an 
incentive to cooperate on the decision regarding the blanket guarantee and the 
partition of the expected recapitalization costs ex-ante. In equilibrium, the 
regulators always declare a blanket guarantee when they anticipate that the ex-
post bargaining decision entails full recapitalization, because a blanket guarantee 
insulates the MNB against panics. The MNB fails to receive protection from a 
blanket guarantee when the optimal ex-post policy equilibrium involves 
liquidation, the risk of a panic is sufficiently low and the risk of insolvency is 
sufficiently high. 
  The results of the paper help understand how cross-border externalities and 
the risk of panic may affect the policies aimed to solve financial problems of 
large, complex and international financial institutes. The model is obviously a 
simplification of a complex system of country and business level relationships. 
For instance, we do not consider financial contagion of panics or the moral hazard 
effects related to blanket guarantee. Moreover, we exclude political factors from 
the analysis. In practice, it might be optimistic to presume that in the event of 
collapse of a large MNB, the home country spends domestic taxpayers’ money to  
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repay to the foreign depositors. In addition, the relative size (political power) of 
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Appendix A 
The proof of Lemma 1 
The total costs of liquidation in both countries is lower than the cost of a panic if 
 









A 0 B 0 A l > β + β + β − β − α = σ − σ − σ Π  (A.1) 
 
In  L B A B A α − β + β = β + β  the LHS denotes the losses of uninsured depositors 
under a panic, whereas the RHS indicates their losses under liquidation. Given 
this and (2.3), (A.1) is positive. In country B the cost of a liquidation is larger than 





B 0 B l B < β − β − = σ − σ . Since the 
total cost of a panic is larger than the cost of liquidation, but the opposite is the 





The proofs of corollaries 1 and 2 
The proof of corollary 1: Since the size of the MNB does not change, we have 
dDA = –dDB; if the size of the MNB grows in country A, the size must fall in 
country B and vice versa. This implies ∂D/∂DA = ∂D/∂DB = 0.  From  the 
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because  > β > β B B A A dD / d , 0 dD / d . QED 
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If the liquidation constraint is not binding, we have 
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In the dominator the sum of the first two terms is negative, the third term is 
negative and the fourth term is positive. As the result, the whole effect is 
uncertain. QED  
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